we have only two options: (i) say that there is also something wrong with the inductive Consider a man who thinks he sees a bird in the distance when it is in fact a small plane. Green seems to be a natural property. If this happened with a loaded coin, it would be lawlike. Intuitively, we think that the green hypothesis will be the lawlike one. His perception is mistaken, but we do not dismiss him as a poor perceiver or suddenly begin to doubt his judgment of his perception. premises can provide a good inductive argument for a given conclusion. Again, this seems like a perfectly comprehensible, if unusual, definition. But when I look at a grue emerald, I do not believe that something caused it to be grue. Why is my experience of the green and not the grue? They won’t have been observed before \(2050\), so the only way for them to be grue is to be blue.. We’ve reached the absurd conclusion that there are blue emeralds out there, just waiting to be pulled out of the earth. Consequently, we believe in the green hypothesis over the grue hypothesis. that ‘grue’ is not in the former category, and that every predicate is in the latter The definition of “grue” is: x is grue iff it is first observed before t and is green, or else first observed after t and is blue [^2] (74). After. But this way of thinking about induction cannot decide between all emeralds being grue or all emeralds being green, because an equally long positive correlation has been observed between emeralds and greenness as has been observed between emeralds and grueness. examined before now. We suppose that “green” can easily and legitimately figure in our inductive inferences. find some relevant difference between the two arguments. But the time of first observation is something entirely coincidental. So maybe we should restrict the terms involved in inductive Suppose, is 7/2/17. argument involving ‘green’, in which case we are rejecting the rationality of induction, or (ii) analyzed into other terms which include reference to a time and place. Without a concept of causation, I cannot experience a causal relation between A and B and will not come to believe or hypothesize that all As are Bs. We suppose that “green” can easily and legitimately figure in our inductive inferences. This will be discussed later. This article is also available for rental through DeepDyve. According to Goodman, legitimate inductive inferences are the ones that are performed on lawlike correlations rather than accidental correlations. (Indeed, it is hard to see how we could innately possess them.). observed before now, or (2), green, and has not been observed before now. The traditional view of induction works like this. If you saw the scene as composed just of isolated elements and didn’t see the fire boiling the water, then you couldn’t abstract the causal relation and come to have a concept of causation. ‘grue’ applies to an object. I will conclude by discussing what Goodmanized predicates reveal about how we acquire beliefs about the unobserved. good first step in putting together a logic of induction: a generalization is confirmed by its Of course, it seems that after 7/2/17 each newly observed emerald will not be grue – certainly no emerald could be both grue and green (provided that it is observed after t), for the definitions would conflict. Another way to see the problem is that the example of ‘grue’ seems to show that exactly the He If the green hypothesis or the grue hypothesis is lawlike, then that correlation is confirmed by its positive instances. Green seems to be a natural property. It just means that we will sometimes be wrong. But these worries can be dismissed; Goodmanized predicates are not illegitimate. Presumably, the rules of induction are what enable us to project into the future – that is, to be able to make accurate predictions with regard to each subsequent, unobserved instance. can now see that ‘green’ is also definable in terms of ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’: something is green if and Lawlike hypotheses involve only projectible predicates, and projectibility, in turn, is determined by entrenchment. says, “As principles of deductive inference, we have the familiar and highly You see the pot, the water starting to bubble, and you see the fire and the stovetop. When we do try to justify the rules of deduction, Goodman thinks, we can do no better than to Which part of the disjunction is effective in the application of the predicate is determined by, , but not the definition. cite our deductive practices: “Principles of deductive inference are justified by their conformity with One says that all emeralds are green and the other says that all emeralds are grue, where grue is said to apply to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue (Goodman 10). Positive instances are not enough. Goodman thinks that no But in addition to this, I submit that you also see (or have some perceptual awareness of the fire boiling the water. them good seems, intuitively, to be that the conclusions of arguments of this form are Consider the following. (. Here’s the thought. A first thought is that ‘grue’ is illegitimate because it makes reference to a specific time; it is Change ), You are commenting using your Google account. Goodman on the classical problem of induction. This argument seems, by the standard suggested above, to be a perfectly good inductive argument. Let’s return to our consideration of the grue and green emeralds. A second intuitive thought is that ‘grue’ is somehow unnatural, because it is defined in terms of justified by being brought into agreement with each other.”. Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Moreover, while grue is admittedly an artificial term, that does not mean that it is illegitimate to predicate it of natural objects. canons of induction to apply only to inductive arguments which do not contain terms which are the pot, the fire) isolated from one another, you see the elements interacting. The definition of “grue” is: (74). Green predicates a naturally occurring property, where grue predicates an artificial and contrived property that does not reflect our natural ontology. Barry Ward, Explanation and the New Riddle of Induction, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 62, Issue 247, April 2012, Pages 365–385, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00044.x. difference between a term which includes reference to a time and place and a term which can be However, when I see that every emerald I have observed has been grue, I am not inclined to form the belief that there is something about the emerald that causes it to be grue. But it cannot be, since it does not give us good reason to believe that all emeralds Every emerald observed so far has been green. which have not been observed till now are blue. After t, one of the two hypotheses must fail, for their predictions contradict each other [^4]. If you saw the scene as composed just of isolated elements and didn’t see the fire boiling the water, then you couldn’t abstract the causal relation and come to have a concept of causation. A lawlike inductive hypothesis is confirmed by its positive instances [^5]; a coincidental inductive hypothesis is not confirmed by its positive instances. Consequently, we believe in the green hypothesis over the grue hypothesis. . Suppose t is 7/2/17. The task of giving canons of inductive inference is the task of explaining when a certain set of generalizations, and the premises are instances of that generalization. It is natural to respond to this puzzle by claiming that something must be wrong with the word What the competing hypotheses “all emeralds are grue” and “all emeralds are green” show us is that this way of thinking about projection into the future is wrong – that this is an inadequate way to explain how we form beliefs about unobserved cases. But every emerald has also been grue. So something is grue if it is first observed to be green before some arbitrary time t, but if it is first observed after t it must be blue (and not green) to be grue. So something is grue if it is first observed to be green before some arbitrary time, it must be blue (and not green) to be grue. but to differences between the properties of being grue and being green. Note that it is just as easy and legitimate to consider this set as it was to consider the green set. instances. The definition of grue is exactly the same before and after t. Which part of the disjunction is effective in the application of the predicate is determined by t, but not the definition.